From the Mises.org:
The zero-interest-rate policy of the Fed is sold to the public as a benign economic rescue in the public interest. The stark reality is that this policy is a disguised tax implemented by the Fed. It takes income from savers and hands it as a subsidy to borrowers. It also facilitates and funds the fiscal deficit policies of central government. Such a well disguised tax is a boon for governments. The cruelest tax of all is this 100 percent tax on interest income, disguised and rationalized as “good” policy.
The zero-interest-rate policy deserves closer scrutiny. Would a saver willingly agree to an economic environment of zero interest rates? Certainly not. Would a debtor prefer a zero interest rate? Absolutely. The saver and the debtor would, under normal, willing-economic-participant conditions, negotiate a “price” for the use of money saved. That price for the use of funds is interest.
The central bank enters the negotiation between saver and borrower, and by counterfeiting money it destroys the negotiating base of the saver. Counterfeiting money through policies of unlimited liquidity provision is a “price control” over interest rates, instituted to force interest rates down and eventually spiral them downwards out of control to zero. The interest income of the saver is eventually taxed to extinction at zero interest rates.
It is basic economic theory that price control actually reduces the availability of the item subject to the control. It should therefore come as no surprise that available credit is falling despite unrestrained liquidity provision at zero interest rates. Banks have no direct cost implication when they hold funds at zero (apart from opportunity cost). Thus there is no direct cost penalty for doing nothing.
Not exploiting a lending opportunity in a high default-risk environment, where the margin between a zero-interest cost of funds and the lending rate is insufficient to protect bankers against default risk, is an entirely rational choice for bankers. While the intended consequence is to increase the availability of credit, the ultimate “zero-rate” intervention actually reduces credit availability. One wonders how significant this unintended consequence would be in the absence of Cash for Clunkers, the now-expanded subsidy policy for housing purchases, and the constant Fed, Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency support for Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. We shall find out when fiscal deficits can no longer fund such excesses.